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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
WEST DISTRICT**

FIX THE CITY, etc.,
Petitioner and Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS ANGELES CITY COUNCIL; LOS ANGELES DEPT. OF CITY PLANNING; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Respondents and Defendants.

HOLLYWOOD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
Intervenor.

LA MIRADA AVENUE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSN. OF HOLLYWOOD, etc.,
Petitioner and Plaintiff,

vs.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Respondents and Defendants.

CASE NO. BS138580

**TENTATIVE DECISION
AND PROPOSED
STATEMENT OF DECISION**

CASE NO. BS138369

**TENTATIVE DECISION
AND PROPOSED
STATEMENT OF DECISION**

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**HOLLYWOOD CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE,
Intervenor.**

)

**SAVE HOLLYWOOD.ORG, aka
PEOPLE FOR LIVABLE
COMMUNITIES, etc., HOLLYWOOD-
IANS ENCOURAGING LOGICAL
PLANNING, etc.,**

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

vs.

**THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS
ANGELES, CITY ATTORNEY OFFICE
OF CITY OF LOS ANGELES, HERB
WESSON PRESIDENT OF CITY
COUNCIL, CARMEN TRUTANICH CITY
ATTORNEY, DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,**

Respondents/Defendants.

**HOLLYWOOD CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE,
Intervenor.**

CASE NO. BS138370

**TENTATIVE DECISION
AND PROPOSED
STATEMENT OF DECISION**

These matters having been tried on September 16 and 17, 2013, and having been submitted for decision, the Court now rules as follows.

INTRODUCTION

The Hollywood Community Plan Update (HCPU) (and its corollary environmental impact report [EIR]), which is a principal subject of this litigation, is a comprehensive, visionary and voluminous planning document which thoughtfully analyzes the potential for the geographic area commonly referred to as Hollywood (as defined in its several

1 hundred pages). The HCPU includes scores of pages of text, detailed maps and tables
2 which together express the finest thoughts of dedicated city planners. The HCPU is
3 intended to be *the* essential component of the General Plan Framework (the
4 Framework) for the City of Los Angeles (the City) as the General Plan for the City (in all
5 of its elements) is applicable to planning and potential growth in Hollywood.

6 This otherwise well-conceived plan is also fundamentally flawed, and fatally so in
7 its present iteration. As petitioners have articulated, and as will be discussed below, the
8 HCPU, and its accompanying EIR, contain errors of fact and of law that compel granting
9 relief to the community groups which challenge adoption of the HCPU and its EIR in
10 their present forms.

11 While one can appreciate the goal of finalizing adoption of the HCPU, its
12 accompanying EIR and related documents, and doing so as close to “on schedule” as
13 possible given the many years since the City began its staged revisions to its General
14 Plan planning documents (culminating in adoption of the Framework),¹ forging ahead in
15 the processing of the HCPU, EIR and related documents in this case based on
16 fundamentally flawed factual premises has resulted in a failure to proceed in the manner
17 required by law. This and other bases for the rulings now made are set out below.

18 TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

19 The matter was tried to the Court on September 16 and 17, 2013. Prior thereto
20 the parties filed extensive briefs, followed by their arguments at length at trial. Following
21 the trial, the parties have filed requests for statement of decision (in addition to that
22 provided for in Public Resources Code section 21005 (c) [requiring that a court specify

23 1

24 The first draft of the Framework was circulated to the public almost twenty years
25 ago, in July 1994. It was not finalized until eleven years later when review of the
26 decision of the Court of Appeal of late 2004 upholding a revised version of the
27 Framework was denied review by the California Supreme Court in February 2005. The
28 attenuated history of adoption of the Framework is described in *Federation of Hillside
and Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252 [*Federation
I*] and *Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles* (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1180 [*Federation II*].

1 all grounds on which a public agency has acted not in compliance with CEQA if it so
2 finds]). While those statements have been filed, a controversy over the requests has
3 been created. It is resolved in the accompanying footnote.²

4 Pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21005(c), Code of Civil Procedure
5 section 632 and California Rules of Court 3.1590, this Tentative Decision is also the
6 proposed Statement of Decision in these matters. If any party now renews its request
7 for a statement of decision, it must timely and fully comply with Rule 3.1590. If not, then
8 this document is also the Statement of Decision in these matters, and prevailing parties
9 are to timely prepare, serve and lodge the appropriate peremptory writs and judgments.

10 **Evidence**

11 The Court admitted the Administrative Record in each case. (It is identical.)

12 Each party has sought judicial notice of certain items. With the consent of the
13 parties, those items which are determined properly the subject of judicial notice in one
14 case are admitted as to all cases.

15 Request for Judicial Notice by Fix the City

16 Fix the City (by Request for Judicial Notice filed August 21, 2013) seeks judicial
17 notice of sections 2.10 through 2.10.6 and 2.11 through 2.11.6 of the City's General
18 Plan Framework EIR (addressing Fire and Emergency Medical Services and Police
19 Services, respectively. These requests are granted pursuant to Evidence Code section
20 452(c).

21 Request for Judicial Notice by La Mirada

22 _____
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23 In addition to filing in each case a list of issues which it contends should be
24 addressed in the statement of decision in each, City and intervenor filed in each case a
25 lengthy set of objections and arguments as to why many of the requests made by each
26 petitioner/plaintiff were erroneous. As no authority to support their editorial comments
27 on the requests made by their adversaries was provided, and the Court is not aware of
28 any authority to challenge another party's *request* for inclusion of any matter or issue in
the statement of decision, the *objections* will not be considered *qua* objections: The
Court is the final arbiter of the contents of its own statement of decision and does
consider the parties' views with respect to its contents in connection with the Court's final
document.

1 La Mirada seeks judicial notice of the meaning of the word “range” according to a
2 particular dictionary and of Los Angeles City Charter sections 554, 556 and 558. The
3 Court grants the second request in full and the first subject to the Court’s own ability to
4 discern the appropriate and applicable meanings of words when used in particular
5 contexts.

6 La Mirada also sought to “supplement” the Administrative Record by its August
7 21, 2013 Notice of Lodging, to which City objected. The items are Chapter 2 of the
8 City’s General Plan Framework and the text of a particular hyperlinked document. The
9 latter is already part of the record pursuant to the correct reading of *Consolidated*
10 *Irrigation District v. Superior Court* (2010) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, 724-725. City’s reading
11 of this case is crabbed. City’s objection to the Framework is frivolous as City itself both
12 seeks judicial notice of the document and cites it in its Opposition (City’s Op. at 11:17-
13 21). La Mirada requests are granted, as is City’s request for judicial notice of the
14 Framework.

15 Request for Judicial Notice by SaveHollywood.org et al.

16 There is no objection to Item 1, which is an opinion in a federal court case;
17 granted.

18 Nor is there any objection to item 2, which is a print out of a web page relating to
19 the census, but the Court sees nothing other than the printed page. That is not sufficient
20 basis for granting a request for judicial notice; this request is denied.

21 City objects to item 3, a SCAG document, but it is in the record at AR 21168.
22 And, under the authority of *Consolidated Irrigation District v. Superior Court, supra*, the
23 report at the hyperlinked cite was already also part of the record. The copy of that report
24 at that link (Exhibit 3 to the Cheng declaration, filed with the Request for Judicial Notice)
25 is merely another copy of the document which is already in the record. This request is
26 granted.

27 Request number 4 is not a part of the record and its contents indicate it is only
28 raw data in any event. It is neither timely nor appropriate for judicial notice; City’s

1 objections to this item are sustained.

2 City's Request for Judicial Notice

3 The requests of City, et al. that the Court take judicial notice of several items
4 (identical in each case) are resolved as follows:

5 Granted as to Sections 555, 556 and 558 of the City Charter. (Exhibits F, G and
6 H.)

7 Granted as to the extracts of the City of Los Angeles General Plan Framework
8 attached to the Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibit B.

9 Granted as to the official opinion of the Court of Appeal in *Saunders v. City of Los*
10 *Angeles*, reserving determination as to the relevance and application of that opinion to
11 the circumstances of this action.

12 As no adverse party objected, the Court also grants the requests as to the
13 existence and filing of each of the Petitions for Writ of Mandate in *Federation of Hillside*
14 *Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles* (two cases) and *Saunders v. City of Los*
15 *Angeles*; and as to the excerpts of the EIR in the *Saunders v. City of Los Angeles*
16 (Exhibits C, D and E).

17 Without additional explanation, which was never provided, the Court finds
18 insufficient the proffer with respect to a single page of the 2013 update of the U.S.
19 Census. (Exhibit A.) Although the population of the HCPU area is a point of
20 considerable interest in and importance to this case, the document attached as Exhibit A
21 to this RJN, was apparently updated in 2013 -- in some unexplained manner — and the
22 particular document attached has no indication of any particular relevance itself.

23 Nor will the Court accept City's apparently implied offer that the Court search the
24 U.S. Census itself. That would be both improper and inordinately time-consuming. City
25 had the obligation to explain the relevance of the document, and in this case to be clear
26 about the particular parts of the document to which it seeks the Court's attention.

27 Declarations

28 The declarations of MacNaughton and Kruse are not proper subjects of judicial

1 notice; nor is Exhibit 1 to the Reply Brief to which it is attached. City's objections to these
2 matters are sustained.

3 Other evidence

4 All other evidence, which is in the Administrative Record, is admitted.

5 Status of the three cases

6 With the stipulation that all evidence admitted in one case is admitted in all, and
7 based on the congruence of the subject matter of the cases, the Court issues this single
8 decision to address the issues presented in each of the three cases.

9 **Background; the Framework Element**

10 City has sought, and the Court has granted, City's request for judicial notice of a
11 portion of "The Citywide General Plan Framework - An Element of the City of Los
12 Angeles General Plan" ("the Framework Element" [the same document the Court
13 referenced *ante* and which was the subject of the cases cited in footnote 1, *ante*).

14 There is no explanation why this document was not originally included in the
15 Administrative Record in this case as it sets forth "a citywide comprehensive long-range
16 growth strategy" for the city and describes the role of community plans such as the
17 Hollywood Community Plan Update (HCPU) at issue in these proceedings.³ (City's RJN,
18 Exh. B, page 2) Thus: "While the Framework Element incorporates a diagram that
19 depicts the generalized distribution of centers, districts, and mixed-use boulevards
20 throughout the City, it does not convey or affect entitlements for any property. **Specific**
21 **land use designations are determined by the community plans.**" [Par.] In fulfillment
22 of the State's [planning] requirements [for general plans (Govt. Code secs. 65300, et
23 seq.)], the City's general plan contains citywide elements for all topics listed except Land
24 Use for which community plans establish policy and standards for each of the 35
25 geographic areas." (*id.*, emphasis added.) The HCPU is or will be such a plan for

26
27 ³

28 The Court also granted Petitioner Fix the City's request that the Court take judicial
notice of segments of Chapter 2 of the same document.

1 Hollywood.

2 The Framework also contains a statement of relevance with respect to the
3 significance of population data:

4 "In planning for the future, the City of Los Angeles is using population forecasts
5 provided by the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG). The
6 Framework Element does not mandate or encourage growth. Because population
7 forecasts are estimates about the future and not an exact science, it is possible
8 that population growth as estimated may not occur; it may be less or it may be
9 more. The City could be at the beginning of a long decline in population or at the
10 beginning of a sharp increase." [Par.] The Element is based on the population
11 forecasts provided by SCAG. Should the City continue to grow, the Element
12 provides a means for accommodating new population in a manner which
13 enhances rather than degrades the environment. The City does not have the
14 option of stopping growth and sending it elsewhere. It must prepare for it, should
15 growth occur. In preparing the General Plan Framework Element, the City has
16 answered the question "What would the City do if it had to accommodate this
17 many more people?" In answer to that question there are two possibilities: 1)
18 prepare a Plan to accommodate density equally among all City neighborhoods, or
19 2) prepare a plan to preserve the single-family neighborhoods and focus density
20 — should it occur — in limited areas linked to infrastructure." (*Id.*)

21 The HCPU is thus the updated, basic planning document for the Hollywood
22 community which "establish[es] policy and standards for [the Hollywood] geographic
23 area[.]. (*Id.*)

24 As will be discussed, the HCPU, includes, *inter alia*, a plan to focus growth along
25 transit corridors and in specific areas of Hollywood. Whether the final environmental
26 impact report for the HCPU withstands scrutiny at this time is the focus of the differences
27 between these petitioners, on the one hand, and City and Intervenor, the Hollywood
28 Chamber of Commerce, on the other.

1 The fundamental dilemma is why and how “specific land use designations” are
2 properly determined based on population estimates which, it is argued and clearly
3 established, are substantially inaccurate.

4 PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS

5 *Waiver?*

6 City and Intervenor contend that certain petitioners waived critical arguments by
7 not asserting them in the administrative proceedings or in the petition for writ of
8 mandate. This contention is an inaccurate statement of what occurred in the
9 administrative proceedings below. Contrary to the claims of City and of Intervenor, it is
10 well-established that whether a particular petitioner made a contention below is not the
11 test for asserting that claim in CEQA proceedings. The question is: Was the subject
12 matter of the claim made *by anyone* below with sufficient specificity?

13 As but two examples of the facts: (1) SaveHollywood raised the issue of the mis-
14 use of the 2005 SCAG population estimate multiple times in the administrative
15 proceeding, and (2) when the 2010 Census data was first incorporated into an official
16 document just days prior to the final action by the City Council, La Mirada wrote to the
17 body before which the issue was then being considered, the City Council, setting out in
18 more than ample detail its objections. *Cf., Endangered Habitats League v. State Water*
19 *Resources Control Board* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 482, 489-491 [exhaustion not required
20 when no opportunity to challenge provided]. Public Resource Code section 21177 is
21 simply not applied in the crabbed manner that City and Intervenor contend. Multiple
22 additional examples of timely stated objections to the points now adjudicated appear in
23 the record. Thus, on the facts, the issues now presented were all timely presented
24 below.

25 Next, there was considerable specificity in the objections made by petitioners (and
26 others) at the several stages of the administrative process, specificity that meets the
27 applicable test, even as discussed in the cases cited by Intervenor (*e.g., Resources*
28 *Defense Fund v. Local Agency Formation Commission* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 886,

1 894). Moreover, better reasoned cases such as *Citizens Assn. for Sensible*
2 *Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo* (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 163, make
3 clear that the specificity prong of the Public Resources Code section 21177 requirement
4 was amply met -- and for all of the issues raised in this proceeding. As the *Sensible*
5 *Development* court states: “ ... less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal
6 in an administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding. This is because “[i]n
7 administrative proceedings, [parties] generally are not represented by counsel. To hold
8 such parties to knowledge of the technical rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver
9 for failure to make a timely and specific objection would be unfair to them.’ (Note (1964)
10 Hastings L.J. 369, 371.) It is no hardship, however, to require a layman to make known
11 what facts are contested.” (*Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d
12 1009, 1020 [87 Cal.Rptr. 908].)” *Id.*, at 163.⁴

13 *Claim Preclusion as to Fix the City?*

14 City and Intervenor advance two arguments as to claim preclusion of certain
15 contentions by petitioner Fix the City; neither is meritorious.

16 First, City mistakenly asserts (City’s Op. at 28-29) that Fix the City’s arguments
17 about mitigation measures are barred because it is “in privity with” with a party to
18 *Federation II* (*id.* at 23:12-27). City cites as its legal authority *Frommhagen v. Board of*
19 *Supervisors* (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1301. That case does not support the
20 argument made. At the cited page that court is addressing claims made by the same
21 party, not which party is in privity with whom. It is clear that in this case we have multiple
22 petitioning parties and that there is no sufficient evidence presented that Fix the City is in
23 legal privity with any other party to the earlier case. City’s claim is without support.
24 See, e.g., *Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency* (2009) 180

25
26 ⁴

27 This last waiver contention is resolved based on the circumstance that the claims
28 which City claims to have been waived are simply elements of petitioner Fix the City’s
Fourth Cause of Action. The cases City cites are inapposite. See Fix the City’s Reply at
25:1-15.

1 Cal.App.4th 210, 229-231.

2 Nor does Fix the City's participation in *Saunders v. City of Los Angeles*
3 (September 25, 2012) (2012 WL 4357444) support City's claim preclusion arguments.
4 As Fix the City points out, the issue presented in *Saunders* was whether City breached a
5 mandatory duty by failing to prepare annual reports on the City's infrastructure (Fix the
6 City's Reply at 22:19-27); it involved the Framework and not either this EIR or the
7 HCPU. It appears that City relies solely upon the circumstance that Fix the City was a
8 party to *Saunders* as barring its contentions here. That argument ignores the material
9 differences in the issues presented in the two cases. Nor were this HCPU and its EIR
10 considered in any respect in *Saunders*; indeed, there is no way either could then have
11 been subject to anyone's consideration as they had only been adopted and approved
12 after the *Saunders* trial court had issued its decision.⁵

13 PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

14 Petitioners' contentions

15 Petitioners advance several arguments in support of their contentions that the
16 HCPU and its EIR were not prepared in the manner required by law, etc.⁶

17 Population base

18 A fundamental contention of all petitioners is that the population data upon which
19 the EIR for the HCPU is formulated is fatally flawed, with the result that the EIR must be
20 revised and then recirculated with appropriate analysis of the corrected basic data.

22 ⁵

23 The Court, *sua sponte*, takes judicial notice of the entry of judgment in the trial court
24 in *Saunders* -- on March 2, 2011 -- a date prior to the public dissemination of the draft
25 EIR in the present case, making City's argument -- that of a party to *Saunders* and with
26 detailed knowledge of its proceedings -- more than difficult: There is no way in which the
claims now made concerning this, later issued EIR (and plan), could have been raised or
litigated in that case. See, *Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water*
Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 225-229 and e.g., *Federation II* at 1202.

27 ⁶

28 Certain petitioners also address claimed general plan defects. Because they are
analyzed according to a different standard, the Court addresses them separately, *post*.

1 Applicable facts

2 The first set of relevant facts is the timeline of significant actions for the items,
3 now listed.

- 4 ● April 28, 2005 * Notice of Preparation of Draft EIR published
- 5 ● March 3, 2011 * Draft EIR released
- 6 ● May 2011 * 2010 U.S. Census data released⁷
- 7 ● October 2011 * Final EIR released
- 8 ● December 11, 2011 * Planing Commission submits HCPU
9 with recommendation of approval of HCPU
- 10 ● May 8, 2012 * City Council Planning and Land Use
11 Management Committee (PLUM Com.) submits HCPU to Council
12 without recommendation
- 13 ● May 18, 2012 * First Revisions to EIR [contains response to SCAQMD]
- 14 ● June 14, 2012 * Second Revisions to EIR - [33 pages; contains references
15 to 2010 US Census data released in May 2011]
- 16 ● June 19, 2012 * City Council meeting at which EIR adopted
- 17 ● June 21, 2012 * Notice of Determination filed

18 The principal factual and legal dispute concerns City's reliance on population
19 data, which City obtained from the Southern California Association of Governments
20 (SCAG), as the base for analysis in the HCPU and its EIR. There is agreement that the
21 base used for analysis was the SCAG estimate of population in 2005 in the HCPU
22 defined area, and that this number was 224,426 persons. The EIR describes this
23 estimate as having been derived from the 2004 SCAG Regional Transport Plan. Neither
24 this 2004 Plan nor any other source data with respect to the 2005 population number
25 appear in the Administrative Record. (Limited background memoranda relevant to the
26

27 ⁷

28 City cited a web address at which census data could be viewed. The Court declines
this entirely non-specific invitation as vague, overbroad and therefore insufficient.

1 population statistics do appear in the Reference Library, but they do not provide the
2 missing data.) The Draft EIR (DEIR) uses a forecast of population for 2030 for the
3 HCPU area of 244,302; this was derived from the same 2004 study. The DEIR also sets
4 out a “revised” population estimate of 245,833.

5 Using these various data points, the DEIR analyzed what it referred to as a
6 “reasonable expected level of development for 249,062 people.

7 Petitioners argue that the fact that the results of the 2010 Census became
8 available just after the DEIR was released compelled revision of the DEIR to utilize that
9 data and that failure to do so was prejudicial error requiring preparation and recirculation
10 of a new DEIR which properly incorporates the 2010 Census population data. (While
11 the exact date of release of this data is a point of dispute among the parties, it is clear
12 that the official United States Government census data became available by May, 2011
13 — within 60 days of the release of the DEIR.)

14 This U.S. Census data is relevant to this litigation because it differs so significantly
15 from that used in the EIR process here. The 2010 Census shows that the population of
16 the HCP area was approximately 198,228 persons. The reason why this is given as an
17 approximation is that the relevant census tracts cover an area slightly different than the
18 boundaries of the HCPU area. This difference is known, however, to City’s Planing
19 Department, and City did make some adjustments to its own data in its Second Addition
20 to Final EIR, dated June 14, 2012, five days before the City Council took final action on
21 the HCPU and its EIR, confirming its knowledge in this respect.

22 The following table summarizes key data and illustrates the petitioners’ contention
23 that the base used by City in its planning constitutes error.⁸

24 _____
25 ⁸

26 While City argues that it was not possible to estimate the population in the HCPU
27 area because of incongruity of census tracts with the HCPU area, the Administrative
28 Record reveals that petitioner La Mirada was able to estimate the population in the
HCPU area at 197,085 persons, and City itself made revisions to the EIR just 5 days
prior to its approval by the City Council to incorporate some of the data from the 2010
Census, as noted in the text.

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1990 U.S. CENSUS | 2000 U.S. CENSUS | 2004/2005 SCAG pop. est. | 2010 U.S. CENSUS | 2030 Forecast in DEIR | 2030 CITY est. |
| 213,912 | 210,824 | 224,426 | 198,228 | 244,302 | 249,062 |

Reference to this table produces some obvious questions including the following:

- (1) Why was the population base which City used for analysis in the DEIR the SCAG estimate of 224,426 when the Official Census data became available within 60 days of release of the DEIR — and when that data shows a significantly lower population (even in a somewhat larger geographic area)?⁹; and
- (2) why was the 2030 population number used not further adjusted once the 2010 U.S. Census data was available?

The 2005 SCAG population estimate was a principal key to the analytical foundation for the DEIR. From it flowed not only the 2030 population estimate used in the DEIR, but, combined with other factors, estimates for water consumption, waste water, solid waste, and energy demand,¹⁰ as well as other elements of the EIR.

As Fix the City aptly describes the function of the EIR: “At the heart of the [DEIR for the HCPU] and indeed the defining purpose of the Plan Update itself, is the accommodation of projected population growth in the Plan area. The purpose of the EIR is to evaluate the environmental impacts of accommodating this growth in the manner and locations set forth in the Plan Update. In this regard, the magnitude of the

⁹

It is clear that City’s Planning Department had the ability to adjust for the slight differences between the HCP boundaries and the census tract data as the latter was discussed in the 33 page June 14, 2012 Second Revision to EIR released just 5 days prior to the City Council voting to approve the EIR -- and the census tracts themselves had been extant for a considerable period of time. City advanced several contentions based on the argued differences, claims that appear fully refuted by the actions taken by its own Planning Department.

¹⁰

The estimates for public safety services will be discussed, *post*.

1 population increase accommodated by the Plan Update is a critical component of the
2 environmental analysis and [is] relied upon in numerous instances throughout the EIR.”
3 (Fix the City’s Opening Memo. at 6:5-21). Thus, it is critical to the EIR that the
4 population base be appropriate to the actual circumstances which exist in the area of the
5 HCPU and its EIR. In this case, it was not.

6 Standard of Review

7 The standard for review of the sufficiency of any EIR is prejudicial abuse of
8 discretion. Public Resources Code sections 21168 and 21168.5. “Abuse of discretion is
9 established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the
10 determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence. *Laurel Heights*
11 [*Impr. Asn. v. Regents* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376,] at 392. A prejudicial abuse of discretion
12 occurs if the failure to include relevant information precludes informed decision-making
13 and informed public participation, thereby thwarting the goals of the EIR process.” *San*
14 *Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, 653.
15 “... the existence of substantial evidence supporting the agency’s ultimate decision on a
16 disputed issue is not relevant when one is assessing a violation of the information
17 disclosure provisions of CEQA. “ *Association of Irrigated Residents v. County of Madera*
18 (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1392.¹¹ A clearly inadequate or unsupported study is
19 entitled to no judicial deference. *Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay v. Board of Port*
20 *Commissioners* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1355.

21 Here, a case cited by respondents also supports petitioners’ contention.¹² In
22 *Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Department of Food & Agriculture* (2005) 136

23 ¹¹

24 The need to be alert for agency misconduct in CEQA matters is especially strong
25 where, as here, the agency is the project proponent. *Deltakepper v. Oakdale Irrigation*
Distr. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1109.

26 ¹²

27 Petitioner La Mirada clearly makes the argument that City did not proceed in the
28 manner required by law. Petitioner Fix the City appears to rely on the other basis to set
aside an EIR, viz., that there is no substantial evidence in its support — a claim joined by
SaveHollywood, as well as by La Mirada.

1 Cal.App.4th 1, the court held that a lead agency cannot forego its own analysis of base
2 data and rely instead on such data provided by another agency. In the present matter,
3 one of City's principal counter-arguments is that it was entitled by law to rely on the
4 SCAG 2005 population estimate. That contention must be and is rejected upon the
5 authority of *Californians for Alternatives, supra*. See also, *Ebbits Pass Forest Watch v.*
6 *Calif. Department of Forestry* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936, 956.

7 There are additional reasons why use of the SCAG population estimate is
8 improper in the context of this EIR. As petitioners explain, this EIR does not contain the
9 "analytical route" by which the lead agency reached the conclusions set out in such a
10 document. This requirement, that fundamental information be disclosed in the planning
11 documents, has been the law for decades. *E.g., Topanga Assn. for a Scenic*
12 *Community v. County of Los Angeles* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506:

13 "We further conclude that implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the
14 agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the
15 analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order. If the
16 Legislature had desired otherwise, it could have declared as a possible basis for
17 issuing mandamus the absence of substantial evidence to support the
18 administrative agency's action. By focusing, instead, upon the relationships
19 between evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate action, the
20 Legislature sought to direct the reviewing court's attention to the analytic route the
21 administrative agency traveled from evidence to action. In so doing, we believe
22 that the Legislature must have contemplated that the agency would reveal this
23 route. Reference, in section 1094.5, to the reviewing court's duty to compare the
24 evidence and ultimate decision to 'the findings' (emphasis added) we believe
25 leaves no room for the conclusion that the Legislature would have been content to
26 have a reviewing court speculate as to the administrative agency's basis for
27 decision." *Id.*, at 515.

28 City and Intervenor contend that City fully complied with EIR requirements, citing

1 Guidelines section 15125(a), which provides:

2 “An EIR must include a description of the physical environmental conditions in the
3 vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is
4 published This environmental setting will normally constitute the baseline
5 physical conditions by which a lead agency determines whether an impact is
6 significant.”

7 In addition to using the SCAG 2005 estimate of a population of 224,426, the DEIR
8 forecast a population of 244,302 residents in 2030 for planning purposes. This data, as
9 noted previously, was derived from the 2004 SCAG transportation report.¹³ The EIR
10 then estimated the “reasonable expected level of development” utilizing a further
11 estimate of the population in the HCPU area in 2030 of 249,062.

12 Considering the *actual* population in 2010 as evidenced by the 2010 Census data,
13 the real population increase essential to analysis in the DEIR was 50,744 rather than the
14 24,636 persons number which was utilized by City. Thus, the analysis in the DEIR was
15 predicated upon a population increase — *well under half* — of what would occur if the
16 2030 estimate were to remain. And, if the population estimate for 2030 were to be
17 adjusted based on what the 2010 Census data had shown, then all of the several
18 analyses which are based on population would need to be adjusted, such as housing,
19 commercial building, traffic, water demand, waste produced — as well as all other
20 factors analyzed in these key planning documents.¹⁴

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22 As Petitioner SaveHollywood points out, the 2004 RPT was not included in the
23 Administrative Record; this is “a fatal error” as it is “a key rationale” for the HCPU and
24 “[b]y omitting purported relevant information from the record, the City deprived the public
25 of the ability to independently verify [City’s] population assumptions and its
environmental assessments predicated thereon.” SaveHollywood.org Opening Memo. at
8:16-21.

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27 As La Mirada points out in its Opening Brief at 7:19-22, just before the City Council
28 voted to approve the several documents in June 2012, City added its conclusion that it
was still reasonable to rely on the 2005 SCAG population base even with the 2010
Census data. That clearly is a post-hoc rationalization of City’s failure to recognize

1 City's reliance on what is "normally" permissible as what is required is misplaced.
2 The very fact that Guideline section 15125(a) uses the word "normally" suggests that
3 there are circumstances in which such reliance is not appropriate. It is well-established
4 that, "[i]n some cases, conditions closer to the date the project is approved are more
5 relevant to a determination of whether the project's impacts will be significant. *Save Our*
6 *Peninsula Com. v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99,
7 125. Thus, the Guideline in which City and Intervenor seek refuge instead recognizes,
8 and the cases support, the petitioners' contention that there are substantial reasons to
9 use a different (up-to-date) baseline when the circumstances warrant, as the
10 circumstance did, and do, in this case:

11 "Administrative agencies not only can, but should, make appropriate adjustments,
12 including to the baseline, as the environmental review process unfolds. *No*
13 *purpose would be served, for example, if an agency was required to remain*
14 *wedded to an erroneous course and could only make a correction on remand*
15 *after reversal on appeal."* *Citizens for East Shore Parks v. California State Lands*
16 *Comsn.* (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 563. (Emphasis added.)

17 Even when the surrounding conditions are recognized close in time to the final
18 certification of the EIR, the baseline must be updated to reflect that new knowledge.
19 *E.g., Mira Monte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Ventura* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 357
20 (identification of additional wetlands made just prior to proposed certification of FEIR).
21 Here, the significant factual predicate for the critical analytical issues explicated in the
22 EIR was known far earlier in the EIR process than that in *Mira Monte*; here, just two
23 months after release of the initial DEIR and over a year prior to final action on the EIR —
24 yet no material adjustments were made. Multiple objections to the continued use of

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26 that the HCPU was unsupported by anything other than wishful thinking — and a
27 demonstration of an effort to avoid further analysis in key planning documents. Nor is
28 an agency's determination marked by changes such as those in evidence here, entitled
to any deference. *Yamaha Corp. v. State Board of Equalization* (2001) 19 Cal.4th 1,
14.

1 these demonstrably incorrect SCAG population estimates repeatedly were made “for the
2 record” by several groups — and ignored by City until their limited [and inadequate] use,
3 just 5 days before final approvals in the Second Addition to Final EIR. This conduct was
4 itself a failure to proceed in the manner required by law. Public Resources Code section
5 21166; *Mira Monte, supra*, at 365-366.

6 When the new facts became known shortly after issuance of the DEIR, the
7 baseline used for analysis should have been adjusted -- in the summer of 2011 rather
8 than proceeding with a fundamentally flawed baseline. The failure to use accurate and
9 then-current data was a failure to proceed in the manner required by law . This is made
10 clear by cases such as *Save our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Board of*
11 *Supervisors* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99: “If an EIR fails to include relevant information
12 and precludes informed decisionmaking and public participation, the goals of CEQA are
13 thwarted and a prejudicial abuse of discretion has occurred. (*Sierra Club v. State Bd. of*
14 *Forestry* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1236 []; *Fall River Wild Trout Foundation v. County of*
15 *Shasta* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 482, 492 []; *County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water*
16 *Agency, supra*, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 954; Pub. Resources Code, § 21005, subd. (a).)”
17 *Id.*, at 128.

18 While CEQA gives the lead agency flexibility in establishing baseline conditions,
19 as Fix the City argues, “that flexibility must be cabined by the rule that all CEQA
20 determinations must be supported by substantial evidence. (Fix the City, Opening
21 Memo. at 8:17-19). Citing Guideline 15384, which defines substantial evidence, Fix the
22 City points out (*id.*, at 9:5 et seq.) that substantial evidence must have a factual basis
23 which is “a serious deficiency of the 2005 estimate.” Decision makers cannot arrive at
24 the required reasoned judgment without it. *Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa v. 32nd*
25 *Agricultural Assn.* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 929, 935.

26 Intervenor errs in its claim that use of the incorrect baseline was not prejudicial.
27 (Intervenor’s Opposing Memo. at 17-18) Rather, as Fix the City argues, use of the
28 flawed baseline “fundamentally distorted the EIR.” (Fix the City’s Opening Memo. at

1 8:20). Also, the attempted remedy to the prior utilization of the wrong baseline data in
2 the DEIR resulted in City inserting an abbreviated analysis of the 2010 census data in its
3 June 2012 Second Addition to the EIR, which contained a merely truncated — and
4 insufficient — discussion of alternatives. As Fix the City notes: “Clearly, if one goal of
5 the plan is to accommodate projected population growth — setting aside entirely the
6 accuracy of the projection — and the City is advised that there is more capacity in the
7 current plan than it realized, its analysis of necessary future actions to accommodate a
8 projected increase would change.” (Fix the City’s Reply. at 9:1-4)

9 What is particularly flawed about the Second Addendum to the EIR is the failure
10 to adjust for the 50,744 new residents that are a direct consequence of City’s original
11 error (use of the 2005 overstatement of population by SCAG rather than the actual
12 number available from the 2010 Census). The Second Addendum is flawed because it
13 is premised on the unsupportable notion that accommodating 50,744 new residents will
14 have less impact than accommodating 24,636 new residents. The utilities, wastewater
15 and public safety discussions of this EIR are all without support and City has not
16 explained the “analytical route the ... agency traveled from evidence to action,” thus
17 rendering invalid its literally last minute attempt (viz., 5 days prior to final approval) to
18 remedy its prior failures and refusals to accept as valid the many objections made to the
19 mistaken use of outdated and substantially wrong SCAG data. See, *Laurel Heights*
20 *Improvement Assn. v. Regents, supra*, (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 404. ^{15 16}

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22 15

23 No party makes any note of the discussion in *Federation II* of a discussion of
24 projections based on SCAG and census data which appears at 126 Cal.App.4th
at 1206-1207. That discussion is not applicable in any event to this case; as may
be inferred by the parties omission of any reference to it.

25 At page 11 of its opening memorandum, City claims that a single sentence in the
26 Framework precludes use of up to date population figures, especially the 2010 Census
27 data. As La Mirada argues (Reply at 7:9-11) “Blind adherence to data [City] knows is
28 wrong is not the ‘good faith effort at full disclosure’ mandated by CEQA. Guideline
section 15151.” See, *Citizens for East Shore Parks v. California State Lands Comsn.*
(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, in which the State Lands Commission as lead agency
revisited its baseline during the environmental review process *and modified it as needed.*

Alternatives Analysis

1
2 Alternatives analysis is a core element of each EIR. *In re Bay-Delta*
3 *Programmatic Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings* (2008) 43 Cal.4th
4 1143, 1162.¹⁷ An EIR must contain and analyze in depth a “range of reasonable
5 alternatives.” *Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors [Goleta II]* (1990) 52
6 Cal.3d 533, 566; Guidelines section 15126.6(c). The range must be sufficient “to permit

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8
9 This practice was specifically approved by the reviewing court of appeal:

10 “To begin with, plaintiffs cite no authority supporting the implied premise of their
11 argument—that the Lands Commission could not revisit the baseline during the
12 environmental review process and modify it as the Commission deemed
13 appropriate or necessary.^[fn omitted] Moreover, such a suggestion is unsound.
14 Administrative agencies not only can, but should, make appropriate adjustments,
15 including to the baseline, as the environmental review process unfolds. No
16 purpose would be served, for example, if an agency was required to remain
17 wedded to an erroneous course and could only make a correction on remand
18 after reversal on appeal. [Par.] The record also reveals a sound basis for the
19 Lands Commission's adjustment of the baseline. Chevron presented the
20 Commission with information about other baseline determinations being made for
21 proposed San Francisco Bay Area projects, and urged it to take the same
22 approach so there would be uniformity in the environmental review process. In
23 addition, the case law in the area was being developed through decisions such as
24 *Fat*, 97 Cal.App.4th at pages 1277–1281, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 402, which endorsed
25 and followed *Riverwatch*, *supra*, 76 Cal.App.4th 1428, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 322. Thus,
26 as the Lands Commission explained, its view of the appropriate baseline evolved
27 over time, ultimately leading to modification of the baseline in the 2003–2004
28 timeframe, some four years before it completed the environmental review
process. [Par.] in sum, the Lands Commission did not abuse its discretion in
defining the baseline used to assess environmental impacts of the proposed
marine terminal lease renewal. The baseline was not contrary to the law, and it
was based on substantial evidence.” *Id.* at 563-564.

16

23 The claims that the petitioners were too late with their objections is devoid of merit.
24 As City only applied the 2010 Census data in the document dated June 14, 2012, five
25 days prior to the City Council vote on the project component documents, and as the
26 record is clear that some of the petitioners made their objections known even in that
27 short time frame, that was all any citizen might (or need) do — and it fully complies with
the standing requirements of CEQA under such a tight time frame. Public Resources
Code section 21167; *e.g.*, *Endangered Habitats League v. State Water Resources*
Control Board (1997) 63 Cal.App.4th 227, 238-240.

28 ¹⁷ The other core element is that of mitigation. *Id.*

1 a reasonable choice of alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned. *San*
2 *Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. County of San Bernardino* (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d
3 738, 750-751. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts. *Goleta II, supra*, at p.
4 566. Among the usually included alternatives is one for “reduced density.” *Watsonville*
5 *Pilots Assn. V. City of Watsonville* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1059. The EIR must always
6 include analysis of the No Project Alternative (Guidelines section 15126.6(e); *County of*
7 *Inyo v. City of Los Angeles* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, 203) which must discuss what
8 would reasonably be expected to occur in the foreseeable future if the project were not
9 approved, based on current plans and consistent with available infrastructure and
10 community services. Guidelines section 15216.6(e). This alternative is not always the
11 same as the baseline environmental setting, and the EIR’s analysis of the No Project
12 Alternative should identify the practical consequences of disapproving the project when
13 the environmental status quo will not necessarily be maintained. *Planning &*
14 *Conservation League v. Dept. Of Water Resources* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 892.

15 In determining what constitutes a reasonable range of alternatives, there must be
16 a set or group of such alternatives which would feasibly attain most of the basic
17 objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the significant
18 effects of the project. Guidelines section 15126.6(a). The term feasible is defined in
19 Public Resources Code section 21061.1 as “capable of being accomplished in a
20 successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic,
21 environmental, social, and technological factors. See Guidelines section 15126.6(f)(1).
22 “The key issue is whether the range of alternatives discussed fosters informed decision
23 making and public participation. *Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents, supra*,
24 47 Cal.3d 376, 404-405.

25 The EIR must identify the alternatives considered in, and those excluded from,
26 EIR analysis and should provide the reasons for their rejection. *Goleta II, supra*, at 569;
27 Guidelines section 15126.6(b). A brief explanation of such excluded alternatives is
28 sufficient; the entire administrative record may be considered in determining whether a

1 reasonable range of alternatives has been discussed. *Id.*, at 569.

2 “The selection of alternatives discussed will be upheld, unless the challenger
3 demonstrates that the alternatives are manifestly unreasonable and they do not
4 contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives.” *Calif. Native Plant Society v. City of*
5 *Santa Cruz* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 988.

6 The EIR in this case contains analysis of three “alternatives”: (1) the current
7 (preexisting, 1988) plan, considered as the No Project Alternative, (2) the
8 current/proposed project, and (3) a plan based on the SCAG 2030 population forecast
9 (which is based on a one percent reduction in population from the proposed project).
10 However, under applicable regulations, there are only two alternatives — Public
11 Resources Code section 21100(b)(4) provides that the project itself cannot be an
12 alternative to itself, as La Mirada points out. La Mirada Opening Brief at 16:17-20.

13 There is a further problem in “counting” the alternatives analyzed: La Mirada
14 points out that Guidelines section 15126.6(e)(3)(A) when read in conjunction with
15 *Planning and Conservation League v. Dept. Of Water Resources* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
16 892, 917-918 suggests that the “No Project Alternative” is not an alternative for purposes
17 of CEQA. Instead, it is simply the continuation of the existing plan, policy or operation
18 into the future....[T]he projected impacts of the proposed plan or alternative plans would
19 be compared to the impacts that would occur under the existing plan.” La Mirada
20 Opening Memo. at 16:21-17:7.

21 However one counts the “alternatives,” the flawed environmental setting
22 presented in these EIR documents makes the analysis insufficient and inaccurate.
23 *Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County Water Agency* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713,
24 738-739. “[W]ithout [an adequate baseline] description, analysis of impacts, mitigation
25 measures and alternatives becomes impossible.” *County of Amador v. El Dorado*
26 *County Water Agency* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 953.

27 SaveHollywood and HELP contend that consideration of a down-sizing/down-
28 zoning (DS-DZ) alternative was both feasible and required based on the actual

1 population statistics and trends. These petitioners argue that notwithstanding multi-year
2 and multi-million dollar investments in infrastructure in the Hollywood community, there
3 has been a net outflow of population and an increase in vacancy rates in both
4 commercial and residential properties. Interestingly, they argue that, based on the
5 SCAG 2005 population estimate, the HCP area has lost over 26,100 people in the five
6 year period 2005-2010 (basing the 2010 population on the U.S. Census data) and there
7 have been massive financial losses connected to construction projects — the key
8 example being the difference between the construction cost and eventual sale price of
9 the Hollywood-Highland Project, of over \$420 million. SaveHollywood Opening Memo. at
10 14-19.

11 Fix the City argues that the EIR's 10 page discussion of the three selected
12 alternatives is perfunctory and "[a]s a result of the deficient alternatives analysis, the EIR
13 fails to provide decision makers and the public with a genuine comparison of the
14 environmental consequences of different levels of development in Hollywood." Fix the
15 City Opening Memo. at 15:9-11. Nor, in Fix the City's view does the Second Addition to
16 the EIR (June 14, 2012) sufficiently address the otherwise insufficient range of
17 alternatives in the manner required by law. This petitioner points out that (1) these
18 environmental documents ignore the requirement that other alternatives be identified or,
19 consequentially, the reasons they were rejected be stated, and (2) that this defect was
20 raised throughout the environmental review process in numerous comment letters.
21 Instead, "The FEIR states that City Planning 'considered and rejected as infeasible an
22 alternative that would place a blanket moratorium on demolition permits and project
23 development.' ... Like the DEIR, the FEIR also fails to meet CEQA's disclosure
24 requirements...." Fix the City Opening Memo. at 16-17.

25 Focusing on the Second Addition document, Fix the City argues that the
26 discussion there of the no-growth and DS-DZ alternatives are infeasible, but neither the
27 EIR nor the Second Addition document contains "sufficient information ... to enable the
28 public or decision makers to adequately evaluate the City's conclusory statements

1 regarding the infeasibility of a downsizing alternative.” *Id.* at 17

2 This argument has particular force when one considers the material discrepancy
3 in the population statistics discussed, *ante*, and the short 5 day window between the
4 release of the Second Addition and the vote by the City Council approving the several
5 documents at issue. The evidence in this record strongly supports petitioners’
6 contention that there has been an insufficiently-reasoned rush to completion of the EIR
7 process, and that the process was administered in a way that is clearly contrary to well-
8 established laws as interpreted by the appellate courts. As Fix the City argues: “The
9 Plan Update EIR ... lacks an analysis of sufficient ranges of alternatives and fails to
10 provide substantial evidence supporting its decisions to analyze only the narrowest
11 range of alternatives. [Par.] While it may be a reasonable policy decision for the City to
12 plan for the level of population growth accommodated in the Plan Update, the City
13 cannot make that decision without a genuine understanding of what the environmental
14 trade-offs are of accommodating this level of growth. The Plan Update EIR is the
15 document designed to inform both the decision makers and the public of the
16 environmental consequences of the Plan Update and of alternative approaches to the
17 critical task of planing the City’s growth.... CEQA does not permit an agency to evade its
18 disclosure duties in this manner; the failure to analyze a reasonable range of alternatives
19 without any support of a finding of infeasibility is an abuse of discretion.” Fix the City
20 Opening Memo. at 18:21-19:7.

21 One can only wonder how this planning process ran so far off the track when
22 consideration is given to the recent history of the Framework itself and the corrective
23 action it required.¹⁸

24 In response to these arguments, neither City nor Intervenor presents any
25 adequate counter-arguments. Both City and Intervenor ignore the cases, statutes and
26 Guidelines cited by the petitioners. City instead focuses, *inter alia*, on other claimed

27 ¹⁸ See footnote 1, *ante*.

1 defects in the petitioners' contentions, but these assertions do not respond to the
2 fundamental point that petitioners have established: City did not proceed in the manner
3 required by law with respect to ascertainment and discussion of these 'core components
4 of the EIR process' as alternatives analysis is defined by our Supreme Court. *In re Bay-*
5 *Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, supra*, 43
6 Cal.4th 1143, 1162.

7 **Public Services**

8 Fix the City contends, and City acknowledges, that the EIR's thresholds of
9 significance did require City to evaluate whether the significant capacity increase
10 permitted by the HCPU would require "unplanned upgrading or improvement of existing
11 fire protection equipment or infrastructure" or would "induce substantial growth or
12 concentration of population beyond the capacities of existing police personnel and
13 facilities; or whether the HCPU would "cause deterioration in the operating traffic
14 conditions that would adversely affect [police and fire] response times. City's Op at 20.
15 As Fix the City points out, "[t]he EIR determined that in fact such thresholds of
16 significance would be exceeded for both police and fire services.... conclud[ing] that,
17 absent mitigation, degraded performance in the[se] critical services was likely." (Fix the
18 City's Reply at 13:4-14.) The issue was of substantial concern to many participants in
19 the environmental and plan review process, including then Council member Eric
20 Garcetti, who wrote a letter (dated March 23, 2012) highlighting the need for improved
21 response times by City's Fire Department (AR21362).

22 Delayed response times of emergency services may be a factor in determining
23 whether increased population concentration is significant. The focus of such analysis is
24 on the physical changes that may result from economic and social changes. Guidelines
25 section 15064(e) addresses this issue; e.g., population increases, as well as other
26 "economic and social effects of a physical change may be used to determine that the
27 physical change is a significant effect on the environment". See *also* Guidelines section
28

1 15131; and *Christward Ministry v. Superior Court* (1986) 184 Cal.App.4th 180.

2 For reasons explained throughout this decision, this EIR is fatally flawed. One of
3 the reasons is particularly applicable here, *viz.*, the failure to use appropriate population
4 statistics leads to fatally flawed estimation of the impact on fire and police services —
5 and their impact on physical changes: “the effects of decreased response capacity,
6 including both physical effects and social/economic effects that lead to physical effects,
7 require [environmental] review.” Fix the City’s Reply at 15:12-13.

8 ***Prejudice***

9 For reasons discussed above in detail, petitioners have demonstrated prejudice
10 compelling the granting of relief. The facts and circumstances of the administrative
11 proceedings in this record clearly evidence as much of a rush to completion of the EIR
12 and HCPU as might be possible in a proceeding of this nature. As described, *ante*, the
13 2010 Census data became available within two months of release of the DEIR. As the
14 time line, *ante*, demonstrates, there was ample time to revisit the critical population
15 estimates and still have the documents [re]circulated, heard at public fora and submitted
16 to various City committees and to the Council by June of the year after issuance. When
17 community members and groups repeatedly wrote and spoke against key elements of
18 the documents now being reviewed — and clearly articulated many reasons why the
19 documents were flawed, there were two rushed efforts to supplement the relevant
20 documents, including the first attempt to address some of the consequences of the 2010
21 Census data — but that only 5 days before the matter was voted on by the City Council.
22 The result was a manifest failure to comply with statutory requirements.¹⁹

23 When a public agency does not comply with procedures required by law, its
24 decision must be set aside as presumptively prejudicial. *Sierra Club v. State Bd. of*
25 *Forestry* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1236. “Noncompliance with substantive requirements of

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27 ¹⁹

28 City’s claim that the Framework mandated that SCAG estimates be used is without support for reasons discussed in the text, *ante*.

1 CEQA or noncompliance with information disclosure provisions ‘which precludes
2 relevant information from being presented to the public agency ... may constitute
3 prejudicial abuse of discretion within the meaning of Sections 21168 and 21168.5,
4 regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted if the public agency had
5 complied with those provisions.” (§ 21005, subd. (a).) In other words, when an agency
6 fails to proceed as required by CEQA, harmless error analysis is inapplicable. The
7 failure to comply with the law subverts the purposes of CEQA if it omits material
8 necessary to informed decisionmaking and informed public participation. Case law is
9 clear that, in such cases, the error is prejudicial. (*Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry*
10 (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1236–1237[]; *Fall River Wild Trout Foundation v. County of*
11 *Shasta* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 482, 491–493 []; *Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of*
12 *Hanford* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 712[]; *East Peninsula Ed. Council, Inc. v. Palos*
13 *Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist.* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 155, 174 []; *Rural*
14 *Landowners Assn. v. City Council* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1013, 1021–1023 []).” *County*
15 *of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 946.

16 That is what occurred here to the legal prejudice of petitioners, mandating relief.

17 **Failure to recirculate**

18 Guidelines section 15088.5(a) mandates that a DEIR be recirculated when
19 “significant new information is added....” Here, it is clear that the significant new
20 information begins with the 2010 Census data, but it cannot stop there. It is also evident
21 that that information must be given full consideration; this will in turn affect much of the
22 analysis in key documents.

23 City’s failure to incorporate and update the DEIR to reflect the significant different
24 population statistics, and all that flows from them, necessarily means that the EIR is
25 fatally flawed. As in *Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Comsn.* (1988) 214
26 Cal.App.4th 1043, this DEIR is fundamentally inadequate, even with the Second
27 Supplement, issued 5 days before City Council action — meaningful public review was
28 thwarted by City’s pyrrhic rush to final approvals. This hasty action constitutes an

1 additional failure to proceed in the manner required by law, which is legally prejudicial.

2 **GENERAL PLAN ISSUES**

3 **Contentions of Fix the City**

4 Fix the City's opening brief sets the argument for this aspect of petitioners'
5 contentions.²⁰ "California law and the Los Angeles City Charter require consistency
6 between the policies set forth in the General Plan and land use ordinances adopted by
7 the City," citing Government Code section 65300.5 and Los Angeles City Charter section
8 556.

9 This petitioner's principal contentions are that the HCPU is "fatally inconsistent"
10 with the Framework because it fails to require policies that will ensure that the timing and
11 location of development are consistent with City's ability to provide adequate
12 infrastructure for additional development.

13 The findings made in support of the HCPU explain, correctly, that the Framework
14 "establishes the standards, goals, policies, objectives, programs, terms, definitions, and
15 direction to guide the update of citywide elements and the community plans."

16 Community plans, such as the HCPU, apply the elements of the Framework
17 regarding growth and development in specific areas of the city, here of Hollywood. The
18 Findings made for the HCPU discuss consistency with Framework Element Objective
19 3.3: "Accommodate projected population and employment growth within the City and
20 each community plan and plan for the provision of adequate supporting transportation
21 and utility infrastructure and public services."

22 The reasoning for the Finding was that the HCPU was consistent with Objective
23 3.3 because it includes a recommended pattern of land use that directs future growth to
24 areas of Hollywood where new development can be supported by transportation
25 infrastructure and different types of land uses can be intermingled to reduce the length

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27 La Mirada makes a similar contention. SaveHollywood.com, *et al.* do not address this
28 issue.

1 and number of vehicle trips.

2 Fix the City places emphasis on this finding because “it focuses exclusively on
3 transportation infrastructure and not [on] other types of infrastructure and public services
4 that are required to support increased population or commercial development; the
5 Finding therefore does not demonstrate consistency with Objective 3.3.” Fix the City
6 Opening Brief 29:2-5.

7 Fix the City further focuses on what it contends is City’s ignoring significant
8 policies included in the Framework that, it argues, are designed to enable City to meet
9 Objective 3.3. “Most significantly, the City’s findings ignore the policies designed to
10 ensure a continual monitoring of population growth *and* the ability of infrastructure to
11 support the pace of growth.... Specifically, the Framework Element requires the use of a
12 monitoring program to assess the status of development activity and supporting
13 infrastructure and public services and “[i]dentify existing or potential constraints or
14 deficiencies of other infrastructure in meeting existing and projected demand.” The
15 [HCPU] is inconsistent with the Framework Element because it does not include any
16 mechanism to ensure that the state of infrastructure will be assessed or to provide for
17 controls for controls on development in the event that infrastructure is insufficient to
18 support the level of development permitted by the [HCPU].... The City’s approach to the
19 Framework Element is focused entirely on the aspects that encourage growth, with no
20 attention to those policies that require period[ic] assessment of the capacity for
21 additional growth. Without inclusion of similar policies in the [HCPU], which is part of the
22 Land Use Element of the General Plan, the City’s General Plan is fatally inconsistent.
23 The [HCPU], while permitting increased density and growth in key parts of Hollywood,
24 fails to provide a mechanism to continually assess whether the infrastructure has the
25 ability to support the increased development and therefore frustrates the policies in the
26 Framework Element that are designed to ensure provision of adequate public services.
27 The Framework Element permits only the appropriate amount of growth in light of the
28 City’s infrastructure; the [HCPU] omits the necessary mitigation measures to require

1 controls on development where the infrastructure is threatened. (Emphasis in original.)
2 Fix the City's Opening Memo. at 29-30.

3 Fix the City next contends that City Charter section 558 mandates a finding that
4 any plan adopted by City will not have an adverse effect on the General Plan or any
5 other plans. And, this petitioner contends that, although City adopted such a finding, the
6 Findings do not demonstrate actual compliance with this requirement. The Findings rely
7 on the concept of concentrating growth in particular sectors, near public transport such
8 as the new metro system, and the protection of existing single-family neighborhoods
9 from denser development. Yet, Fix the City argues, "[t]he Finding is notable for what it
10 lacks: any substantive discussion of the potential [inter]-plan effects of the [HCPU]. Fix
11 the City next poses the question: "How can the decision makers conclude that the
12 [HCPU] will not have an adverse effect on other community plan areas without
13 considering if the increased growth facilitated by the [HCPU] will harm other areas?"
14 (Fix the City Opening Memo. at 30:16-18).

15 Fix the City concludes as follows: "Because this analysis [that of inter-plan/area
16 impact] is not in the EIR or in the record before the Council, substantial evidence does
17 not support this finding. Indeed, the record before the City showed that public services
18 are stretched thin throughout the City. On this record, the City cannot find that the
19 [HCPU] will not adversely affect other areas of the City; the finding must be overturned."
20 (*Id.*, at 30:18-22.)

21 **La Mirada's Contentions**

22 La Mirada also contends that the HCPU is not consistent with the General Plan
23 for the City of Los Angeles, but focuses on different aspects. This petitioner's view is
24 that, while the Framework is "growth neutral," the HCPU is not. Instead, La Mirada
25 argues first, that the HCPU is "growth inducing," and contends that the reason the 2005
26 SCAG population estimate was used was to lower the population increase for which
27 planning was required in the HCPU to just over 24,000 -- rather than the more accurate
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1 number of 50,000 — that would need to be planned for for 2030.²¹ Using the true
2 population data results in a plan that is growth inducing according to La Mirada, which it
3 argues “provides for a significant amount of excess capacity, a growth inducing effect.”
4 La Mirada’s Opening Memo. at 23:3-23.

5 Second argues La Mirada, the objective of growth neutrality was dropped in the
6 final EIR and HCPU. Thus it notes that the final version of the HCPU accommodates
7 “more than double the natural amount of growth through 2030, dropp[ing] all pretense of
8 growth neutrality, further showing an inconsistency with the ... Framework. [Par.] The
9 result is an internally inconsistent General Plan. Is it growth accelerating and inducing,
10 as provided for in the Land Use Element via the HCP, or is it growth accommodating
11 and neutral, as required by the Framework.... Because of this inconsistency, the City
12 cannot make the necessary findings required by Section 556.” (La Mirada, Opening
13 Memo. at 24:10-16).

14 **City’s Contentions**

15 City advances several counter-arguments in defense of its actions.

16 On the key issue of whether the General Plan and Specific Plans must be
17 consistent -- and how that requirement is achieved here -- City first acknowledges that a
18 general plan must be “internally consistent and correlative“ (City’s Op. Memo. at 25:24-
19 27), and then points out that City has broad discretion to balance the many competing
20 policies expressed in the general plan — and that balance “does not require
21 equivalence, but rather a weighing of pros and cons to achieve an acceptable mix”
22 (citing *Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville* [2007] 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 822
23 [quotations and citations omitted]). After noting the many factors and interests described
24 in the findings made in this case, City notes the role of a court reviewing such

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27 Whether that was the reason to use the higher baseline, or not, the result is the same
28 — a substantial error in the population baseline and in all planning aspects that rely on it
for other impacts.

1 arguments: “A reviewing court’s role is simply to decide whether the city officials
2 considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the proposed project
3 conforms with those policies. (*Id.*, at 816 [internal citations omitted]).

4 Specifically in response to Fix the City’s contentions,²² City argues that there was
5 no need to make a specific finding that the HCPU was consistent with Framework
6 Objective Element 3.3. (City’s Op. Memo. at 27:14-22). City’s argument is that the
7 HCPU is an amendment to a previous plan, the Hollywood Community Plan, which is
8 itself a part of the General Plan, and that the adoption or amendment of a general plan
9 is a legislative act -- and, pursuant to state law, “a city need not make explicit findings to
10 support its action.” *South Orange County Wastewater Auth. v. City of Dana Point* (2011)
11 196 Cal.App.4th 1604, 1619.

12 Further, City argues that General Plan amendments are governed by Charter
13 Section 555 rather than section 556, which does not require any specific findings. And,
14 to the extent that Section 556 applies, the findings it requires only need to show “that
15 the action is in substantial conformance with the purposes, intent and provisions of the
16 General Plan; it does not require a separate specific finding of consistency for each of
17 the thousands of policies and objectives contained in the General Plan.... The City’s 16
18 pages of General Plan consistency findings would easily satisfy any requirements
19 Section 556 would impose, if applied to the HCPU.” (City’s Op. Memo. at 27:28-28:7)

20 **Applicable Law**

21 1. Consistency

22 “[T]he propriety of virtually any local decision affecting land use and development
23 depends upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its elements.’ (*Citizens*
24 *of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors* [1990] 52 Cal.3d 553, 570, 276 Cal.Rptr. 410,
25 801 P.2d 1161.) ‘The consistency doctrine has been described as ‘the linchpin of

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27 City’s collateral estoppel arguments as to Fix the City were discussed and found
28 invalid, *ante*.

1 California's land use and development laws; it is the principle which infuse[s] the concept
2 of planned growth with the force of law.' *Corona – Norco Unified School Dist. v. City of*
3 *Corona* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 994, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 803.) 'A project is consistent
4 with the general plan ' "if, considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and
5 policies of the general plan and not obstruct their attainment." ' ' "A given project need
6 not be in perfect conformity with each and every general plan policy. [Citation.] To be
7 consistent, a subdivision development must be 'compatible with' the objectives, policies,
8 general land uses and programs specified in the general plan.'" *Families Unafraid to*
9 *Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board of Supervisors* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1336
10 [emphasis added].

11 "The general plan and its parts must be "an integrated, internally consistent and
12 compatible statement of policies for the adopting agency." (Govt.C. 65300.5; see
13 *Karlson v. Camarillo* (1980) 100 C.A.3d 789, 161 C.R. 260; *deBottari v. Norco* (1985)
14 171 C.A.3d 1204, 1210, 217 C.R. 790, *infra*, §1029 [referendum inconsistent with
15 general plan is invalid]; *Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado County v. Board of*
16 *Supervisors of El Dorado* (1998) 62 C.A.4th 1332, 1336, 1341, 74 C.R.2d 1 [although
17 given project need not be in perfect conformity with each and every general plan policy,
18 it must be compatible with objectives, policies, general land uses, and programs
19 specified in general plan; some general plans are more specific than others, leaving less
20 room for discretion].)

21 "If a general plan is to fulfill its function as a 'constitution' guiding 'an effective
22 planning process,' a general plan must be reasonably consistent and integrated on its
23 face. A document that, on its face, displays substantial contradictions and
24 inconsistencies cannot serve as an effective plan because those subject to the plan
25 cannot tell what it says should happen or not happen. When the court rules a facially
26 inconsistent plan unlawful and requires a local agency to adopt a consistent plan, the
27 court is not evaluating the merits of the plan; rather, the court is simply directing the local
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1 agency to state with reasonable clarity what its plan is.” *Concerned Citizens of Calaveras*
2 *County v. Board of Supervisors* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 90, 97.

3 The court in *Garat v. Riverside* (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 259, *overruled on other*
4 *grounds in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743, fn. 11
5 (discussed on this point in *Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of*
6 *Supervisors* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 388 [*Napa Citizens*], confirmed the application
7 of the consistency requirement to charter cities such as Los Angeles, explaining that
8 under Govt. Code sec. 65700(a), a charter city's general plan must contain the
9 mandatory elements required by Govt. Code sections 65300 et seq. and section 65700,
10 which construed together require not only that a charter city's general plan have the
11 mandatory elements of Govt.Code sec. 65302, but also that these elements be internally
12 consistent as required by Govt. Code sec. 65300.5. *Id.*, at 285, 287. *See Irvine v. Irvine*
13 *Citizens Against Overdevelopment* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 868, 875, 876, 879 [Govt.C.
14 65860(a) prohibition of inconsistent zoning ordinances applied to charter city that had
15 enacted ordinance requiring zoning and general plan consistency; hence, proposed
16 referendum inconsistent with general plan was properly declared invalid]. As colorfully
17 explained in *Napa Citizens, supra*, a “zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with the
18 general plan is invalid when passed [citations] and one that was originally consistent but
19 has become inconsistent must be brought into conformity with the general plan.
20 [Citation.] The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate that general plans will be
21 amended to conform to zoning ordinances. The tail does not wag the dog. The general
22 plan is the charter to which the ordinance must conform.” *Id.*, at p. 389.

23 2. Standard for review of general plan/specific plan consistency issues

24 General plan consistency issues such as those presented by these parties are
25 reviewed under a particularly deferential standard. While a city has broad discretion to
26 weigh and balance competing interests in formulating development policies (*Federation*
27
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1 *Il, supra*, at p. 1196), a charter city's²³ general plan must be internally consistent.

2 The case upon which City relies sets out the standard to be applied here: "The
3 adoption or amendment of a general plan is a legislative act. [Citation.] A legislative act
4 is presumed valid, and a city need not make explicit findings to support its action.
5 [Citations.] A court cannot inquire into the wisdom of a legislative act or review the
6 merits of a local government's policy decisions. [Citation.] Judicial review of a legislative
7 act under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985²⁴ is limited to determining whether the
8 public agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, entirely without evidentiary support, or
9 procedurally unfair. [Citations.] A court therefore cannot disturb a general plan based on
10 violation of the internal consistency and correlation requirements unless, based on the
11 evidence before the city council, a reasonable person could not conclude that the plan is
12 internally consistent or correlative. [Citation.]" (*Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v.*
13 *City of Los Angeles* (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1195, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 543.) SOCWA
14 has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the amendment to the general plan
15 rendered the plan internally inconsistent. (See *Garat v. City of Riverside* (1991) 2
16 Cal.App.4th 259, 293, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 504, disapproved on other grounds in *Morehart v.*
17 *County of Santa Barbara* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143.)"
18 *South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City of Dana Point* (2011) 196
19 Cal.App.4th 1604, 1618-1619 [*South Orange County*].

20 On the other hand, it is also true that direct conflict is not the litmus test for
21 general plan consistency. All three petitioners cite *Napa Citizens*, a leading case on this
22 issue. And, City does not either rely on or seek to distinguish the holding of *Napa*
23 *Citizens* when discussing the consistency arguments made by petitioners.

24 In *Napa Citizens*, the court of appeal specifically addresses the consistency issue

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27 There is no dispute about Los Angeles' status as a charter city.

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Clearly a typographical error in the opinion; the citation should be to section 1085.

1 in a way that the court in *South Orange County* does not. The *Napa Citizens* court
2 explains:

3 “We are of the opinion that the consistency doctrine requires more than that the
4 Updated Specific Plan recite goals and policies that are consistent with those set
5 forth in the County's General Plan. We also are of the opinion that cases such as
6 *FUTURE v. Board of Supervisors, supra*, 62 Cal.App.4th 1332, do not require an
7 outright conflict between provisions before they can be found to be inconsistent.
8 The proper question is whether development of the Project Area under the
9 Updated Specific Plan is compatible with and will not frustrate the General Plan's
10 goals and policies. If the Updated Specific Plan will frustrate the General Plan's
11 goals and policies, it is inconsistent with the County's General Plan unless it also
12 includes definite affirmative commitments to mitigate the adverse effect or
13 effects.” *Id.*, at 379.

14 By contrast with *Napa Citizens*, the facts and procedural setting discussed in
15 *South Orange County* lead to the conclusion that it is of limited value; indeed it is readily
16 distinguishable from the present case. There, the issue of consistency with the general
17 plan was not presented to the trial court; and the question of conflict was far more limited
18 -- there, only whether a single zoning change was appropriate in the context of that
19 general plan — rather than the massive, multi-faceted set of issues addressed in the
20 HCPU. Further, the court of appeals there noted that no change could occur without
21 further action, including review by the Coastal Commission. *Id.*, at 1609.

22 **Analysis**

23 Applying these principles to the present case, City's opening argument in its
24 opposition, that it was not required to make findings in support of the HCPU, although
25 literally true, nevertheless lacks merit.²⁵

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27 It also is inconsistent as City concedes it was required to make findings in support of
28 the zoning changes called for by the HCPU, which it did.

1 While Charter section 555 contains no requirement that findings be made, this
2 does not obviate the need for consistency. The consistency doctrine is, as noted, “the
3 linchpin of California’s land use and development laws.” *E.g., Families Unafraid, etc. v.*
4 *County Board of Supervisors, supra*, 62 Cal.App.4th at 1336.

5 Fix the City points to what it contends is a fundamental inconsistency between the
6 Framework and the HCPU, *viz.*, City’s failure to address the absence from the HCPU of
7 “policies that require monitoring of infrastructure to determine whether the growth
8 permitted in the Plan Update should continue at a given time. The City’s Revised
9 Findings reveal how the Plan Update twists the monitoring requirements in Framework
10 Policy 3.3.2 (the infrastructure monitoring policy)..... The City’s position is that the Plan
11 Update sufficiently addressed the infrastructure capacity of the area such that *no further*
12 *monitoring is required during implemental of the Plan Update. This hands-off policy is*
13 *completely contrary to the Framework Element’s objective of continuous monitoring of*
14 *development activity.* By asserting that the Plan Update conclusively establishes the
15 ability of the infrastructure to absorb the level of development planned, the City thwarts
16 the Framework Element’s policy of limiting development when capacity becomes
17 threatened. The failure to include a monitoring requirement makes the Plan Update
18 inconsistent with the Framework Element.” Fix the City’s Reply at 24:8-26 [first
19 emphasis in original; second emphasis added].

20 La Mirada’s reply to City’s arguments is multi-faceted.

21 (1) City’s reliance on SCAG estimates is faulty and there is no substantial
22 evidence to support the validity of that 2005 SCAG estimate;

23 (2) there is internal inconsistency with the Framework’s focus on “growth
24 neutrality” as the true data reveal that the HCPU is in actuality a plan to more than
25 double the population in Hollywood;

26 (3) City’s plan to focus growth close to transit stations elevates one policy over
27 others, creating an inconsistency; and

28 (4) the 16 pages of findings used by City to justify its actions start from a false

1 premise — the misleading population data used by City which is “less than half what the
2 [HCPU actually] provides..... Accordingly, there is no evidence on which to base the
3 findings, and abuse of discretion is established. Code of Civil Proced. Sec. 1094.5(b).”
4 (La Mirada Reply 17:26-18:3.)²⁶

5 City’s reliance on the holding of *Napa Citizens, supra*, that “a governing body’s
6 conclusion that a particular project is consistent with the relevant general plan carries a
7 strong presumption of regularity that can be overcome only by a showing of an abuse of
8 discretion” (*id.*, at 357) is correct (City’s Opposition Memo. at 8:15-19) — but on these
9 facts, circumstances and record — not sufficient. Petitioners’ arguments on lack of
10 consistency, particularly those of Fix the City, on balance, overcome the presumption of
11 regularity and explain why adoption of the HCPU on this record constituted an abuse of
12 discretion.

13 The Court also concludes that the actions of City do constitute an abuse of
14 discretion. Fix the City, in particular, cogently sets forth the reasons (summarized
15 above). The fundamental inconsistency between the Framework and the HCPU on the
16 failure of the HCPU monitoring policy is completely contrary to the Framework’s
17 essential component of continuous monitoring of development activity. There is a void
18 in an essential aspect of the HCPU where instead there should be a discussion of the
19 inter-plan/area impacts created by the HCPU. And, to the extent City relies on the
20 entirely discredited SCAG 2005 population estimate (with the substantial impact that has
21 on many facets of the HCPU), there is a fatal inconsistency between the HCPU and the
22 General Plan.

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25 Citation of this statute is inapposite; perhaps an inadvertence comparable to the
26 typographical error noted in footnote 24, *ante*. General Plan adoption issues are
27 legislative acts reviewed by ordinary mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section
28 1085. Govt. Code section 65301.5; *Yost v. Thomas* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 570-571;
Federation II, supra, at 1195; see, generally, Miller & Starr, Calif. Real Estate Law, 3rd
Ed. Ch. 25:9 at p. 25-39 and fn. 32.

1 The HCPU cannot survive in its present form and substance in the face of these
2 very substantial inconsistencies. The HCPU is fatally flawed as a planning document as
3 it presently stands.

4 5 **CONCLUSION²⁷**

6 For the reasons stated, petitioners are entitled to relief as follows:

7
8 (1) to a peremptory writ of mandate ordering respondents and defendants City
9 and City Council to (a) rescind, vacate and set aside all actions approving the HCPU and
10 certifying the EIR adopted in connection therewith and all related approvals issued in
11 furtherance of the HCPU, including but not limited to the text and maps associated with
12 the HCPU, the Resolution amending the Hollywood Community Plan, the adoption of
13 rezoning actions taken to reflect zoning changes contained in the HCPU, all
14 amendments to the General Plan Transportation and Framework Elements made to
15 reflect changes in the HCPU, adopting the Statement of Overriding Considerations,
16 adopting the Mitigation and Monitoring Program, and adopting Findings in support of the
17 foregoing; and (b) initiate the process of amending the HCP in a manner that conforms
18 to the policies and objectives of the General Plan and the requirements of CEQA;

19
20 (2) an injunction that respondents and defendants City and City Council, their
21 officers, employees ,agents, boards ,commissions and other subdivisions shall not grant
22 any authority, permits or entitlements which derive from the HCPU or its EIR until an
23 adequate and valid EIR is prepared, circulated and certified as complete and is
24 consistent with CEQA, CEQA Guidelines, and all other applicable laws, and until legally
25 adequate findings of consistence are made as required pursuant to the Charter of the

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28 The relief set out below is the full relief to be awarded in the three cases. Any
argument made and not addresses is deemed rejected.

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City of Los Angeles and other applicable laws;

(3) attorneys fees and costs as may hereafter be determined.

DATED: December 10, 2013

ALLAN J. GOODMAN
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT